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ABSTIÍACT
PRICE PERFORMANCE OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS IN 
ISTANBUL STOCK EXCHANGE
İBRAHİM HALİL ÖZTOP
M.B.A. Thesis
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Can Şımga Mugan
Tliis study aims at investigating the price behavior of initial public offerings (IPOs) in 
Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) during 1994 and 1995 in the short- and medium-term. The 
study is also devoted to the structure, pricing methods, timing, advantages and disadvantages 
o f IPOs and the existing regulatory environment. The existence of significant abnormal positive 
returns o f new issues on the first and fifth trading days is the proof o f underpricing. However, 
no significant excess returns are observed for the second and third week following the initial 
trading. The absence of significant abnormal initial returns in the IPO market in ISE during the 
same period suggests that new issues follow the general market movement. On the first and 
third month after the initial trading, the IPOs are overpriced since there exist significant 
abnormal negative initial returns. The observed high variability on average returns indicates 
that there might be some stocks that are underpriced while there might be some stocks that are 
overpriced. Investors purchasing new issues at the initial offering earn positive abnormal 
returns in the early aftermarket period. IPOs are profitable investments in the short-term (until 
the fifth trading day), but perform quite poorly over longer periods (after the first month 
following the initial trading date).
Key words: Initial public offering (IPO), underpricing, overpricing
ÖZET
İSTANBUL MENKUL KIYMETLER BORSA’SINDA HALKA AÇILAN ŞİRKETLERİN
FİYAT PERFORMANSLARI
İBRAHİM HALİL ÖZTOP
M.B.A. Tezi
Tez Yöneticisi; Doç. Dr. Can Şımga Muğan
Bu çalışmanın amacı, 1994 ve 1995 yılında İstanbul Menkul Kıymetler Borsa’sında 
(İMKB) halka açılan şirketlerin kısa ve orta vadede fiyat davranışlarını araştırmaktır. Halka 
arzların yapısı, fiyatlandırma metodlan, zamanlaması, avantajları, dezavantajları ve mevcut 
yasal düzenlemeler de bu çalışmada incelenmiştir. Birinci ve beşinci işlem gününde yeni hisse 
senetlerindeki anormal pozitif getirilerin varlığı düşük fiyatlandırmanın kanıtıdır. Ancak, ikinci 
ve üçüncü haftada önemli sayılabilecek fazla bir getiri görülmemiştir. Bu dönemde önemli 
anormal ilk getirilerin olmayışı yeni hisselerin genel piyasa hareketini izlediğini göstermektedir. 
İlk işlem tarihinden bir ve üç ay sonra, önemli anormal negatif getirilerin mevcudiyetinden 
halka arz edilen şirketler yüksek fıyatlandırılmışlardır. Bazı hisselerin düşük veya yüksek 
fıyatlandırılabileceği, gözlemlenen yüksek sapmalardan anlaşılmaktadır. Yeni hisse senetlerini 
halka arz zamanında alan yatırımcılar ilk işlem gördüğü tarihlerde anormal pozitif getiri 
sağlamaktadır. Halka arzlar kısa vadede (ilk beş güne kadar) karlı bir yatırım iken, ancak orta 
dönemde kötü bir performans göstermektedir.
Anahtar kelimeler; Halka açılan şirketler, düşük fiyatlandırma, yüksek fiyatlandırma.
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Most companies start up by raising equity capital from a small number of investors, 
with no liquid market to accommodate those investors who wish to sell their stock later. If a 
company prospers and needs additional equity capital, it generally finds desirable to go public 
by selling stock to a large number o f diversified investors.
Going public refers to the change in status of a private company that wants to access 
the public capital market. The decision to go public may be due to the need for capital, the 
prestige of owning part of a public company or the desire to set up a profitable exit from the 
company for major shareholders.
Historically, Turkish firms have relied on bank loans to finance their on-going 
operations. However, after the establishment o f Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) in 1985, 
companies began to use equity finance. The motives behind this preference of the companies 
were high interest rates and insufficiency o f medium and long term credits in our country. 
Consequently, initial public offerings (IPOs) have become very popular. The sparkling 
performance of ISE has provided a suitable environment for the launch o f new issues.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the initial public offering process, there exist three stakeholders: issuer (firm), 
investor, investment banker (underwriter). The cmcial point in the process is the pricing of 
initial public offering. If  the price is set too low, the issuer does not get the füll advantage o f its 
ability to raise capital. If the stock is priced too high, the investor will get an inferior return
and the oftering will not be successful. Investors, moreover, would be unwilling to purchase 
offering from an investment banker with a record o f overpriced offerings.
Many studies have been conducted on the IPO market from different perspectives. The 
documented studies in finance literature covered the short-run and long-run performance of 
IPOs, the reasons o f the underpricing o f IPOs, underwriter price support, underwriter 
reputation and its impact on the ^pricing of new issues, the choice of the offering method in 
IPOs and the firm value.
In the light o f the available literature, this study aims at investigating the pricing of the 
new issues in ISE. The purposes of the study are to analyze the initial return characteristics of 
IPOs in ISE, and to determine whether the new issues are underpriced or overpriced. The 
stocks that have been offered to the public during 1994 and 1995 constitute the sample o f this 
study. This study concentrates on short-term and medium-term price behavior of IPOs in the 
days and weeks following the offer.
The paper is organized along the following lines. The following chapter presents the 
definition, advantages, disadvantages and structure of initial public offerings. Chapter 3 is 
devoted to the recent IPOs in ISE, focusing on the various pricing methods employed and the 
existing regulatory environment. The documented studies in finance literature is presented in 
Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, data and methodology o f the study are discussed. The results of the 
tests and concluding comments constitute Chapter 6 and the last chapter, respectively.
n . BACKGROUND ON IPO
IT. 1. Definition
The first public equity issue that is made by a company is referred to as an initial public 
offering (IPO). It is the first effort by private firms to raise capital in a equity market. From 
the financial point o f view, a firm’s ability to carry its operations in a healthy manner depends 
on its financial resource’s strength and composition. For a firm it is necessary to find 
additional funds to make investments and implement its capabilities. Although a firm is able to 
use bank loans, it must strengthen its equity base to provide a feasible and rational combination 
of debt and equity. For this purpose, companies should increase their equity or find new 
shareholders. Publicly traded stocks have greater liquidity, which allow the companies to raise 
capital on more favorable terms than if it were privately held. Although there are different 
reasons behind the companies’ decision to issue new stocks, basically to strengthen financial 
base, to be protected from undesired economic conditions and growth are the main objectives.
The executives and shareholders o f the company considering going public should raise 
several questions before beginning the process. The alternatives to going public, the existence 
of cheaper and faster ways to raise capital and the influence of IPO on future performance of 
the company are some issues that management should bear in mind. Management also must 
evaluate the advantages and disadvantages o f going public.
Financial stability from the raising of needed capital: When growth can no longer be 
financed internally or through borrowing, management will consider a public offering. Future 
capital requirements for manufacturing facilities, working capital, marketing efforts, 
acquisitions funded with cash, expanding into new industries or products, research and 
development are some expenses to consider when analyzing how much cash a company needs 
to raise. However, the planning process should start well before the capital is required, bearing 
in mind that an ottering will take at least six months.
Availability of stock for acquisitions: Today mergers and acquisitions are very popular 
means of corporate expansion often financed through an exchange of stock. It is difficult to 
establish a fair market value for the shares being exchanged. The shares o f a public company 
are valuated by the market which makes this process simpler than private mergers and buyouts. 
Having publicly traded stock to offer allows companies and individuals who receive the stock 
to know they will have a profitable exit from the transaction, via a public market ready to 
accept their shares when they sell.
IT. 2. A dvan tages  o f G oing  Public
Means of exiting for inside share holders: By going public, officers and directors and early 
shareholders have a way of exiting from the company and knowing what they will get. It can 
be also realized as an employee compensation incentive. Stock options and other incentive 
programs help employees feel that they are part of the organization and that they benefit 
beyond a paycheck for doing a good job. When employees see that there is a ready market 
available for their shares, the job becomes more attractive to them.
Added prestige and increased visibility for the company: Newspapers may carry news 
about important corporate events. Analysts may provide company information for brokers and 
investors who spread the word about the great things happening at the company. Suppliers 
and customers are eager to do business with public company because they assume public 
entities are more financially reliable.
Improved borrowing capability: The equity capital generated by an IPO improves the debt- 
equity ratio and enhances the company’s cash position. These two improvements are the key 
factors that the bankers love to see. The news about important corporate events and their 
reliable positions in the marketplace are the positive factors for the bankers in the evaluation of 
the company.
Founder diversification: As a company grows and becomes more valuable, its founders often 
have most o f their wealth tied up in the company. By selling some o f their stock in a public 
ofl'ering, they can diversify their holdings thereby reducing somewhat the riskiness of their 
personal portfolios.
IL 3. Disadvantages of Going Public
Closure of future financing from venture capitalists: The offering process is the final step 
for venture capitalists as an exit from a company. An IPO is the incentive for them to be in the 
deal in the first place. Once a company has gone public, there is very little reason for a venture 
capitalist to become involved in the company.
New management techniques: New management techniques may be required of company 
ofticers to increase the stock price of the company. New owners may want to determine how 
the company runs. If the company’s earnings or the stock price is not improving, shareholder 
approval may be difficult to get. Keeping stockholders, brokers and analysts informed also 
requires certain techniques. Management may want to retain a financial public relations firm to 
help fulfill disclosure requirements. It takes time and money to provide regular reports, press 
releases and other information that must be provided to the investors and regulators in order to 
keep them informed about their company.
Full disclosure of personal and company skeletons: Complete and adequate disclosure is the 
primary focus of Capital Markets Board (CMB). All details relating to the company, its 
officers, directors and major shareholders must be announced. If the company is relatively new 
and has a short track record, the risks inherent in investing in the company must be also 
detailed.
Expense of going public: There are many costs that management has to pay for application, 
disclosure, road shows to attorneys, auditors, printers, underwriters and regulatory agencies.
Possible loss of control: The stock market is going to indicate at what level the company’s 
stock compares to the stock price o f similar companies in the same industry. If the price is not 
high enough to raise the amount o f capital required, the size o f the offering may have to be 
increased. In this case, it is possible that the buying public shareholders could gain control 
such as changing the board of directors and management.
Ongoing expense of being a public company: The cost of remaining a public company is 
another expense that management should consider. The cost of preparing periodic reports, 
the proper disclosure and reporting documents are some examples.
Inactive m arket and low price: If the firm is very small and its shares are traded infrequently, 
its stock will not be liquid and the market price may not be representative of expected value of 
the stock.
II. 4. S tructure
The goal of the company must be to raise an adequate amount o f capital via the 
offering in the most effective way. One of the considerations must be what is an appropriate 
means of structuring the offering. There are two types of going public: direct issue and indirect 
issue. In the first method, the company issue new stocks by itself The latter one is issue new 
stocks using an intermediary. The important ingredient to complete a successful offering is to 
use the right vehicle. For example, to do a straight stock offering may result in substantial 
ownership dilution, unacceptable to current stockholders.
There are two major components to the valuation process o f an IPO: the total amount 
of money to be raised based on the capitalization and the per share price based on the market. 
The amount of money to be raised through the offering should be determined considering the 
financial needs analysis o f the company together with investment banker. The selection o f the 
investment banker depends upon several factors such as: reputation in IPOs, expertise in the 
company’s particular industry, marketing strengths (including whether the bank will sell
primarily to institutional or retail customers), the quality of post-public offering support, 
investment bank’s research analysts, market-making capabilities and strengths in other strategic 
areas (for example mergers and acquisitions). The company should also assess the 
underwriter’s level of commitment to the deal and whether the underwriter has competitive 
offerings scheduled at the same time as the company’s offering is proposed.
In indirect issue, the other crucial point is the choice o f offering method. When a firm 
goes public with an initial equity offering, it has two options on how to issue the stock. Using 
an investment banker, the firm can issue stock to the public with either a firm-commitment 
(underwriting) or a best-efforts agreement. In the period from 1977 to 1982, Ritter (1987) 
found that for firms using investment bankers, 64.6% used firm-commitment offerings while 
35.4% used best-efforts offerings. A third, but less frequently used, possibility is a direct 
offering without any use of an investment banker. In both types o f offerings the investment 
banker distributes the new shares, but in a firm-commitment agreement he or she performs the 
additional function of insuring the proceeds to the issuer. In addition, a firm-commitment 
agreement uses the reputational capital o f the investment banker to certify the value o f the issue 
to a greater degree than in best-efforts offering.
In Nancy L. Bower (1989), the offering method chosen affects both the firm’s cost of 
obtaining capital and investors’ perceptions about a firm value. A partially pooling, partially 
separating equilibrium is found where high valued firms have information about their values 
revealed in a firm commitment offering, while low valued firms use best-efforts offerings and 
are unable to distinguish themselves from other firms. Firm-commitment offerings are more 
correctly valued by investors and one would expect to see a low variance o f returns across 
companies. The value o f a best-efforts offering, on the other hand, is in general incorrectly
perceived by investors. During the period following the offering, investors would be expected 
to learn more information about the firm and revise their price perceptions toward the actual 
value. The initial inaccurate pricing and revisions during the year will lead to greater variance 
in post-oflering returns for best-efforts offerings than for firm commitment offerings.
Once management has determined the amount of capital to be raised, the question of 
price per share takes on added significance since that will determine the number of shares to be 
offered. The number of shares offered impacts how much of the company must be given up 
and possibly, who controls the company. The key during this part of the process is how the 
company is valued and the importance of that valuation to investors who may buy the offering. 
The price range o f the company’s stock is determined by negotiations between the company 
and the underwriters. It is important that the company discuss valuation at the earliest stages of 
the offering, including as part of the process of selecting an investment bank. The valuation is 
prepared after the study o f current market conditions, past and projected financial 
performance, product or technology position, management team, potential for growth and new 
products in development. The underwriter obtains pricing comparisons by selecting several 
companies in the same industry that are closely related as possible to the offering company in 
revenues, earnings, total capitalization, length o f operating history and the product line to 
identify a range o f values.
The real key to successful pricing is for underwriter to get accurate and timely 
comparables. The comparables help set a pricing range, at the time o f actual pricing it is all 
supply and demand. Once those companies are identified and the stock prices tracked, the 
price the stock is trading at can be used as a benchmark for the pricing of the offering. The 
factors considered by the underwriter when comparing the company with already public
companies are financial ratios, profit margins, amount and type of debts, growth potential of 
the company. Prior to writing the prospectus, part of the registration statement filed with 
CMB which is the source of disclosure of all the negative and positive information about the 
company, a detailed analysis is done by the underwriter including: thorough review of the 
industry, company’s history, investigation of all products and services, a review of company 
relationships with affiliated companies and subsidiary arrangements, review of employment and 
management, financial statement analysis, projections for earnings, investments, strength and 
weaknesses o f the company, threat and opportunities in the sector.
Understanding the principles that will be applied and the comparable companies that 
will be considered will help the company better understand the variations in valuation. The 
company should also take an active role in identifying comparable companies in the industry. 
The underwriters and the company will agree on a range o f prices at the outset, which will be 
refined before filing, with the exact price o f the shares determined just prior to commencement 
o f the offering, based on the market and the reaction o f potential purchasers to the offering. 
The company and the underwriters will agree on the size o f the offering by taking into account 
the company’s capital needs, dilution to the existing stockholders, the level o f public ‘float’ 
desirable to achieve active trading market and liquidity for current stockholders, market 
receptivity and proposed price per share. Among these factors, creating liquid market for the 
stocks has a crucial place for the successful offering. Institutional investors, who have a 
tremendous impact on the market, like to see deep and active trading market for the stocks. If 
there are fewer shares, large investors concerned with any buy or sell orders will create large 
fluctuations in the price.
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The ultimate responsibility for determining the timing of an offering is with the 
company. Once the general scope of the timing has been determined, the undewriters prepare 
a time and responsibility schedule indicating key dates in the process and assigning 
responsibilities for the various tasks that must be accomplished. The key to successful offering 
above the company considerations is market timing. It should be emphasized that timing the 
market influences how the stock is valued. This does not mean that a company cannot go 
public. A company can do a public offering at almost any time but at what price. Management 
must decide whether it is willing to accept the stock price the market dictates at any given time. 
Obviously when the market is hot, the stock will receive a more favorable valuation. A 
company in need for capital may not be in a position to wait for a down market to turn around. 
In some cases, even in a good market, particular industries are not in favor. Again this does 
not mean that a company in that industry can not raise money. The company will pay a 
penalty of reduced capital raised or increase the number o f shares sold through an offering. 
Management and underwriter, after all paperwork and documentation has been done, can 
select the most suitable time for offering. To do so, they should watch overall stock market, 
the industry, selected public companies in the industry and their price actions.
II. 5. Pricing
The pricing of IPOs is very difficult, because there is no observable market price prior 
to the offering and many of the issuing firms may have little or no operating history. If the 
price is set too low, the issuer does not get the full advantage of its ability to raise capital. If 
the stock is priced too high, the investor will get an inferior return and the offering will not be 
successful. Investors, moreover, would be unwilling to purchase offering from an investment 
banker with a record o f overpriced offerings.
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There is no universally applicable mathematical formula which will give a precise 
quotient of value. The uncertainty of the company’s future performance within a changing 
economic/business environment, the lack of precision with which one can pinpoint the 
realizable synergetic benefits and the impact of human/psychological attitudes, create a wide 
area within which value of the subject company may fall. It is necessary to draw low and high 
parameters o f value within which the stakeholders intend to execute their strategies. Forming 
the lower parameter will be the value of the company in its existing form without any 
synergetic benefits arisen from the proposed offering. At the higher parameter, the strategic 
benefits formed by the offering will be taken into account and the optimistic environment will 
be assumed to exist. Within the lower and higher parameter range, the value of the stock is 
determined considering the benefits of stakeholders; issuer, investor and investment banker.
There are 3 commonly used valuation approaches, each with their own advantages and 
limitations: discounted cash-flow valuation, relative valuation and contingent-claim valuation.
The most intellectual and logical valuation method, discounted cash-flow valuation, is 
to project forward performance o f the company and to discount that future stream of cashflow 
to a present value with an appropriate discount rate, then to subtract debts from the present 
value. In our country, the applicability o f this method is very difficult due to economic and 
business environments and discount rate.
In relative valuation, the value o f an asset is derived from the pricing of comparable 
assets, standardized using a common variable such as earnings, cash flows, book value and 
sales. One illustration of this approach is the use o f an industry-average price/earnings ratio to
12
value a firm assuming that the other firms in the industry are comparable to the firm being 
valued and the market on average price these firms, correctly. The other multiples in use are 
price/book value ratio, price/sales ratio, price/cash flows and price/dividends. In our countiy, 
the most common used method is relative valuation especially P/E multiple.
A contingent claim or option is an asset that pays off only under certain contingencies: 
if the value o f the underlying asset exceeds a prespecified value for a call option, or is less than 
a prespecified value for a put option. An asset can be valued as a call option if the payoffs on it 
are a function o f the value o f an underlying asset; if that value exceeds a prespecified level, the 
asset is worth difference; if not, it is worth nothing. It can be valued as a put option if it gains 
value as the value o f the underlying asset drops below a prespecified level and if it is worth 
nothing when the underlying asset’s value exceeds that specified level. This method is not 
widely used in both developed and emerging markets.
13
m. REGULATION OF IPOs IN TURKEY
In 1981, a new Capital Markets Law was enacted which established the Capital 
Markets Board (CMB) as the main regulatory body with responsibility for supervision and 
regulation of Turkish securities markets. The ISE was established in 1985 and commenced 
business in early 1986.
The principal function of the CMB is to take such measures to foster the development 
of the securities markets in Turkey, thereby contributing to the efficient allocation of financial 
resources in the Turkish economy and ensuring adequate protection for investors. The CMB 
supervises and regulates among public companies, banks and other financial intermediaries, 
mutual funds, investment corporations, investment consultancy firms and audit firms which 
offer their services to institutions operating in the capital markets.
The CMB performs its regulatory role through the promulgation o f regulations defining 
the capital markets and the rules which participants in such markets are required to observe. 
The CMB regulations require that all securities publicly offered by issuers in Turkey be 
registered with the CMB. A prospectus filed with the CMB for registration must include such 
information as is necessary to enable a prospective investor to assess the merits of the issuer 
and the proposed investment. The CMB may refuse registration in the event that the CMB is 
not satisfied with the level o f disclosure in the prospectus. The type and scope of information
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required to be disclosed to the public under the CMB regulations is considerably less detailed 
than disclosure requirements of more developed securities markets such as the United States.
In connection with its supervisory role, the CMB requires companies which are subject 
to its jurisdiction prepare and publish balance sheets, income statements and annual reports, all 
of which must be prepared in accordance with accounting principles and standards set forth by 
the CMB. These companies must hold its annual meeting o f shareholders within three months 
after the end of its fiscal year and within one month thereafter file its balance sheet, income 
statement and annual report in respect of the previous fiscal year, in a form audited by the 
CMB-approved auditors. In addition, unaudited quarterly reports must be filed in respect of 
each financial period ending in March and September, and semi-annual report, subject to 
limited review of the independent auditors, must be filed with the CMB in respect of the first 
six months o f each year. In the event of any special circumstance such as a merger or 
acquisition, the CMB may require that additional information be disclosed by a public company 
or directors or major shareholders o f a public company or other related parties in order to 
protect the interests o f small investors.
Capital Market Law defines first issue o f shares as going public. However, Turkish 
Capital Market Law has a very broad definition of going public; besides issuing new shares it 
also includes arrangements for selling the shares in the definition. Consequently, this definition 
considers firm’s invitation o f public to buy the shares as going public.
Companies may issue new stocks either by themselves, called direct issue or use an 
intermediaiy, called indirect issue. Regulation considers issuing shares to the public, related 
arrangements, conducting financial analysis, industry analysis, preparing documents and
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applying to the Board as intermediary activities. In indirect issue, the offering method is 
classified into two; firm-commitment (underwriting) and best-efforts. In a firm-commitment 
agreement, the firm can issue equity using an underwriter who determines the value o f the 
firm and certifies this value to investors for a fee. Thus a firm that employs underwriter has its 
value revealed, so the firm will get the planned amount of money from the issue less the 
underwriter’s fee. In the best-efforts agreement, the investment banker does not guarantee 
that the stocks will be sold or that the company will get the cash it needs, only that it will put 
forth its best eflbrts to sell the issue. In this agreement, the underwriter fee is less than fee in 
the firm-commitment agreement so the company will save the remaining portion. There exist 
two ways of equity issue in the firm-commitment agreement according to Turkish Capital 
Market Law : full underwriting and underwriting. In the first one, the value of all shares 
offered to public must be fully paid to the firm in cash after public sales. There exists an upper 
limit for the financial responsibility in the firm-commitment agreement. By law, the 
underwriter can not guarantee more than two times o f the amount of paid-in capital plus 
reserves of the bank. In the latter method, the banker agrees to buy the remaining shares that 
can not be sold in the specified period and pay for these shares after the issue.
There are two ways of initial public offering in Turkey:
a) Increase capital and sell the new issued shares to the public ( preemptive rights not
used).
b) Sell the existing shares to the public (selling from the portfolio).
I
The information to be disclosed during the public offering o f shares shall be included in 
the prospectus. According to the type o f capital market instruments and going public, the 
Capital Market Board has determined the content of the information to be included in the
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prospectus. Information and documents determined by the CMB is attached to the application 
for registration to the board. The CMB observes the deficiencies in the documents and 
requires the documents to be completed. Before the registration of the shares to the CMB, the 
prospectus shall not be delivered to the public or any other institutions. After the registration 
of shares with the CMB, the prospectus shall be registered and announced at the official 
gazette. The prospectus requires companies to disclose; a description of the company’s 
business, its properties, identification of officers and directors, the plan for distributions of 
securities, the last three-year’s financial statements. The prospectuses are not prepared as fill- 
in-the-blanks forms but similar to brochures. The financial statements in prospectuses must be 
audited by an independent external audit firm. In addition to the information required by the 
form, the issuer must also provide any other information necessary to make the statements 
complete and not misleading. The invitation to the public to buy the shares by means of 
circular is determined by the CMB and published at official gazette. The announcement and 
explanations directed to the public may include neither wrong, exaggerated nor misleading 
information. The CMB may prohibit the advertisements which it considers misleading. The 
sale of shares to the public shall be influenced within the context of the principles and within 
the sales period set forth in prospectus. The CMB requires that selling from the portfolio 
should be made according to flill-commitment agreement. The issuer or the intermediary 
institutions must provide the registered prospectus to all purchasers. The sale o f shares may be 
performed in stock exchange or out o f stock exchange.
There are two ways of selling methods in initial public offerings: book building and 
selling in the stock exchange. In the method o f book building, after all orders are gathered 
within the sales period, the distribution of shares will be made by satisfying at least all investors 
if demand exceeds supply. In this method, there are two ways o f pricing: book building by
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fixed price and book-building by receiving offer for price. In the latter method, the first trading 
price is quoted as the initial offering price in the prospectus in the stock exchange and the 
margin is 5% for the trading days. This lasts for five days and for these periods, only the 
intermediary can quote bid order and other intermediaries are on the ask side.
18
IV. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON IPO
In finance literature, a number o f studies documented the performance of initial public 
offerings for almost every equity market. The documented studies in finance literature covered 
the short-run and long-run performance o f IPOs, the reasons of the underpricing of IPOs, the 
impacts o f underwriter price support and underwriter reputation on the pricing of new issues, 
the choice of the offering method in IPOs and the firm value.
Previous research shows that, on average, the difference between the IPO offering 
price and the first trading market price is greater than reasonable risk premium. Different 
researchers (Tinig 1988; Carter and Manaster 1990; Ritter 1991; Rock 1986) have attempted 
to provide some explanations for the abnormal initial returns. In the research of Ibbotson, 
Sindelar and Ritter (1988), measured from the offering price to the market price at the end of 
the first trading, IPO produce an average initial return that has been estimated at 16.4%. Over 
time researchers used different models to explain underpricing of IPOs. The study of Keasey 
and Short (1992) on UK Securities Market and Kunz’s and Aggarwal’s (1994) research on 
Swiss Market are the similar attempts related to the underpricing of initial public offerings.
One of the model explaining the underpricing is adverse selection models based on 
winner’s curse phenomenon suggested by Rock in 1986 and advanced further by Carter and 
Manaster in 1990. Winner’s curse is based on asymmetric information. There are two groups 
of potential investors in the market: a) the informed investors who invest in information 
production and subscribe to IPOs only when they expect the after-market price to exceed the
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oftering price and b) uninformed investors who subscribe to every IPO indiscriminately. Since 
there is always uncertainty about the market prices of IPOs, if the issuers and their investment 
bankers attempt to offer the securities at their expected market clearing prices, the uninformed 
investors will end up purchasing disproportionately large shares of the overpriced issues. In 
order to keep up the uninformed investors in the IPO market, the investment bankers have to 
ofler the securities at discounts from their expected after market prices. Their losses from the 
overpriced allocations would be compensated by the excess returns on the underpriced issues.
The signaling models predict that issuing firms try to signal positive information to the 
investor by underpricing IPOs. Michaely and Shaw (1994), consistent with the winner’s curse 
hypothesis, show that in markets where investors know a priori that they do not have to 
compete with informed investors, IPOs are not underpriced. IPOs underwritten by reputable 
investment banks experience significantly less underpricing and perform significantly better in 
the long run. It is found that firms, that underprice more, return to the reissue market less 
frequently and for lesser amounts, than firms that underprice less, and firms, that underprice 
less, experience higher earnings and pay higher dividends, contrary to the models’ predictions. 
Enhancing banker relations with investors formulated by Welch (1989) based on signaling is 
that good firms underprice to leave a good taste in investor’s mouth. Jegadeesh, Weinstein and 
Welch (1993) signaling models in which firms underprice their initial public offerings of equity 
so that they can subsequently issue seasoned equity at more favorable prices. A positive 
relation is found between IPO underpricing and the probability and the size o f subsequent 
seasoned offerings.
In Information Cascades model, stated by Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1994), 
potential investors pay attention to not only their own information about a new issue but also
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to whether other investors are purchasing. An investor may decide not to buy even if he has 
favorable information when he observes that no one else is buying. Therefore, the issuer may 
underprice to induce first few potential investors to buy and thereby setting oif a cascade in 
which all subsequent investors want to buy irrespective o f their private information.
One way to explain underpricing o f IPOs is a form of insurance to reduce legal liability 
of investment banker. TinÍ9 (1988) develops and tests the hypothesis that underpricing serves 
as a form of insurance against legal liability and the associated damages to the reputations of 
investment bankers. The empirical results based on samples o f IPOs that are brought to the 
market before and after the Securities Act o f 1933 provide considerable support for implicit 
insurance hypothesis. Specifically, gross underpricing and market segmentation between 
prestigious investment bankers in originating unseasoned new issues appear to be peculiar to 
the post 1933 era.
A popular explanation for underpricing of unseasoned equity is based on risk aversion 
o f underwriters: investment bankers purposely underprice new common stocks to reduce their 
risks and costs o f underwriting. In other words, underpricing serves as a method of reducing 
the chances of ending up with an unsuccessful issue and the associated losses.
Monopsony-Power Hypothesis, another explanation proposed by Ritter (1984), is that 
gross underpricing may be a result o f the monopsony power of the investment bankers in 
underwriting common stocks o f small speculative firms. Large and reputable investment 
bankers generally do not accept to underwrite common stocks of small, speculative, start-up 
firms. According to Ritter, the IPO market is segmented. The IPOs of small firms are 
underwritten by investment bankers who can exercise greater bargaining power over the
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issuers. These investment bankers intentionally underprice the securities and ration them to 
their large customers who regularly buy a variety o f investment services from them.
Consequently, difi'erent hypotheses about the reasons o f underpricing in the IPO market 
suggest differences in the degree of abnormal returns across different offer size and price 
categories, different risk classes o f firms and different classes of underwriters. Thus, some 
types o f IPOs, such as high risk IPOs, are underpriced more (Ritter, 1984). This observation 
leads to another stream o f research in the IPO market: namely the presence of hot and cold 
issue markets. Hot issue markets refer to the periods during which initial returns o f IPOs are 
excessively high.
The investment bank’s reputation will have an explanatory power in the question of 
why IPOs are underpriced. It is argued that the level of investment banker prestige is 
negatively related to the riskiness o f IPOs. In the research o f Johnson and Miller(1988), three 
main hypotheses explaining the issues underwritten by prestigious investment bankers should 
exhibit lower initial returns are tested and the following conclusions are derived: The first one 
is that prestigious bankers underprice less than non-prestigious bankers. The second is that the 
lower initial returns that are exhibited by prestigious underwriter are caused by differences in 
risk alone and that banker prestige has no explanatory power in its own right. The third one is 
that the low initial returns exhibited prestigious bankers are caused by the tendency to associate 
with less risky issues more than non prestigious bankers. Carter and Manaster(1990) examined 
the returns earned by subscribing to initial public offerings of equity. It is shown that in IPOs, 
more informed investor require higher returns. The marketing of underwriter’s reputation 
reveals the expected level o f informed activity. Prestigious underwriters are associated with 
lower risk offerings. With less risk there is less incentive to acquire information and fewer
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informed investors. Consequently, prestigious underwriters are associated with IPOs that have 
lower returns.
Aftermarket support o f an initial public offering (IPO) is an effort by the underwriter to 
prop up aftermarket prices when the market price would decline without intervention. Schultz 
and Zaman (1994) studied the aftermarket for 72 IPOs using comprehensive trade and quote- 
change data from every market maker for the first three days o f trading is studied. 
Underwriters quote higher bid prices than other market makers for issues that commence 
trading at or below the offer price. Underwriters repurchase large quantities of stock in the 
aftermarket without risk by overselling the issue by the amount of the overallotment option. If 
the IPO is hot, the overallotment option is exercised. If not, the short position is covered with 
aftermarket selling. Ruud (1993), after the investigation of the distribution of initial returns 
following IPOs, showed that positive mean initial returns may reflect the existence of a partially 
unobserved left(negative) tail. Most IPOs with zero one-day returns subsequently fall in price, 
suggesting that underwriter price support may account for the skewed distribution and hence 
the phenomenon o f positive average initial IPO returns, even if offering prices are set at 
expected market value.
Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1994) in a recent paper find that underpricing persists 
over time and there are three anomalies associated with IPOs: (1) first day returns that average 
10-15%, (2) cycles in both the volume o f new issues and the magnitude o f the first day returns 
and (3) long run underperformance. The argument related with these anomalies in the paper is 
that periodic overoptimism by investors creates windows o f opportunity during which many 
firms rush to the market resulting in disappointing returns to long term investors when the 
issuers fail to live up to overly optimistic expectations. In contrast, firms that issue during low-
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volume periods typically experience neither high initial price run-ups nor subsequent long run 
underperformance.
The other phenomenon documented by Ritter(1991) is in the long run, initial public 
offerings appear to be overpriced. In his study, issuing firms during 1975-1984 substantially 
underperformed a sample o f matching firms from the closing price on the first day of the public 
trading to their three year anniversaries. There is substantial variation in the underperformance 
year to year and across industries, with companies that went public in high volume years faring 
the worst. The patterns are consistent with an IPO market in which (l)investors are 
periodically overoptimistic about the earnings potential of young growth companies and 
(2)firms take advantage o f these windows o f opportunity.
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V. DATA AND M ETHODOLOGY
The stocks that have been offered to the public during 1994 and 1995 in ISE constitute 
the sample o f the study. In 1994 and 1995, there were 25 and 29 new stocks issued in ISE, 
respectively. One out of 25 stocks in 1994 and 6 out of 29 stocks in 1995 are the stocks of 
investment partnership. In constructing the sample, investment partnership due to their 
characteristics of relying on the performance of the stocks on their portfolios are excluded. 
Two out o f 47 companies, namely Özfinans Factoring and Borova Yapı listed on regional 
market were also excluded. 45 companies constituting the sample corresponds to 
approximately 30 % of the total stocks since there were 158 stocks that were being traded on 
the market before these public offerings. The relevant raw data is obtained from Reuters and 
the initial offering prices and the closing prices are adjusted considering the realized paid in 
capital increases and dividend payments up to June 28, 1996, announced in annual and 
monthly factbook of ISE.
V. 1. Istanbul Stock Exchange
The Istanbul Stock Exchange, ISE, was established in 1985 and commenced business 
in early 1986. The trading on the ISE has traditionally been characterized by a high degree of 
short-term speculative trading which is attributable in part to the relatively underdeveloped 
institutional investor base in Turkey and to the relatively small size o f retail investor base. 
Trading prices for securities listed on the ISE are generally limited a range established daily by 
the ISE. Traders are not permitted to place orders at prices which are more than 10% higher
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or 10% lower than the weighted average price of the relevant security in the preceding trading
session.
Turkish disclosure and regulatory standards are less stringent in many respects than 
standards in more developed securities market. Less information on Turkish companies may 
be publicly available than regularly published by and about companies in developed securities 
market. Furthermore, there is lower level of regulation and monitoring o f the Turkish 
securities markets and activities of investors in such markets as compared with the securities 
markets in the US, UK and certain other countries.
The ISE is considerably smaller and less liquid than securities market in USA, UK and 
certain other countries. As o f March 31, 1995, the total market capitalization of all companies 
whose equities regularly trade on the ISE was 2,213.4 trillion TL. The average daily traded 
value o f the stocks o f all companies, for 1995, was 9.5 trillion TL. A disproportionately large 
percentage o f the market capitalization and trading value of the ISE is represented by a small 
number of listed companies. The average daily traded value of the five most actively-traded 
stocks on the ISE for 1995 was 2,612 billion TL which represented approximately 27.5% of 
the average daily traded value o f all stocks traded on the ISE in 1995. As of December 
31,1995, the shares o f 205 companies were regularly traded on the ISE. Five companies are 
offered to the public and traded on the ISE as o f May 1,1996. As of December 31,1995, the 
combined market capitalization o f the ten companies with greatest market capitalization whose 
equity securities regularly trade on the ISE was 42.54 percent of the market capitalization of all 
companies regularly trading on the ISE as o f that date.
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The is e  İs highly volatile market. The ISE reflected the political and economic 
uncertainty in Turkey in 1994 and 1995. On April 4, 1994, following a series o f devaluations 
of Turkish Lira in January and February 1994, and increases in certain macroeconomic 
imbalances, but prior to the adoption of the Austerity Package, the ISE Composite Index stood 
at 16356.48. Following the announcement o f the Austerity Package, the Index declined to 
14737.37 as of May 30,1994 and began to rise and stood at 27257.14 on December 30, 1994. 
In 1995, the highest daily closing value o f the ISE is 54653.93 on April 21. Due to the 
political uncertainty faced in the fourth quarter of 1995, the Index dropped to 37757.81 on 
November 29 and began to rise to 38779 on December 30, 1995 and at 67045 on March 31, 
1996.
V. 2. Data
As aforementioned, the purpose o f the study is to analyze the initial return 
characteristics o f IPOs in ISE and to determine whether the new issues are underpriced or 
overpriced. The study concentrates on short term and medium term price behavior of IPOs in 
the days, weeks and months following the offer. Initial return characteristics are analyzed 
through the use of the closing prices o f the first trading day, five, ten and fifteen successive 
trading days to make inferences about short term price behavior of IPOs in ISE during 1994 
and 1995. The initial return characteristics for medium term price behavior are analyzed 
through the use o f closing prices after one month and three months following the first trading 
day. Although the returns for a month and three months can be regarded as a short term 
returns in developed securities markets, these durations are considered as medium terms for the 
investors in ISE due to reflections of economic and political uncertainty in our country on ISE, 
highly volatile market.
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The sample in 1994 contained 24 IPOs managed by 13 different leader intermediaries 
(Appendix A. 1.). The size o f the issues and the offering prices spanned a wide range. Issue 
size ranged from 3,700,000 shares to 145,000,000 shares and from 54 billion TL to 780 billion 
TL. The shares o f the companies offered to the public spanned from 8.62% to 38.5%. The 
offering prices ranged from 4,000 to 65,000 in nominal TL. The volume of the offerings in 
1994 totaled to 7,683,665,012,000 TL. Seventeen firms issued their stocks to the public with 
a firm-commitment (underwriting) agreement, whereas seven firms preferred best-efforts 
agreement in their offerings. Again, seventeen firms issued their stocks by increasing the paid- 
in capital and selling the new issued shares to the public (constraining their preemptive rights) 
and the rest o f the sample; seven companies, sold the existing shares to the public (selling from 
their portfolio). Among twenty-four IPOs, the shares of eighteen and four firms were sold 
according to book building by receiving offer for price and book building by fixed price, 
respectively and the stocks o f other two companies were sold in the stock exchange.
In 1995, the sample contained 21 firms which were offered to the public by 12 different 
leader brokers (Appendix A.2.). The issue size spanned from 750,000 shares to 300,000,000 
shares and from 15 billion TL to 1,950 billion TL. The shares o f the companies offered to the 
public ranged from 0.99% to 31.82%. The offering prices were in the range of 2,800 and 
25,500 in nominal TL. The volume of the offerings in 1995 totaled to 10,698,461,750,000 
TL. Nineteen firms and two firms issued their stocks to the public with a firm-commitment 
agreement and best-efforts agreement, respectively. Among twenty-one IPOs, the shares of 
thirteen and five firms were sold by collecting orders with a fixed price and with a book­
building, respectively, and the stocks of other three companies were sold in the stock 
exchange. Ten firms issued their stocks by increasing the paid-in capital and selling the new
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issued shares to the public and eight companies sold the existing shares to the public. Three 
firms used two ways in their initial public offerings at the same time.
V. 3. Methodology
Initially, the price returns were analyzed for short-term and medium-term price 
behavior o f new issues in 1994 and 1995. The first day price returns have been calculated 
through the use o f the offering prices and the closing prices o f the first trading day. The 
weekly price returns have been calculated for five, ten and fifteen successive days following the 
first trading day. The monthly returns were calculated for one month and three months after 
the first trading day. The raw price returns were computed in the following manner;
R(it) = ( ( P(it) -P(iO)) / P(i0))*100
where
R (it): the price return of stock i in t periods after the offering.
P (it); the closing price o f stock i in t periods after the offering which is
adjusted for the stocks dividends and splits if any.
P(iO): the adjusted initial offering price o f stock i.
Since the stocks have been offered to public in different periods, the market adjusted 
returns, AR(it) will be calculated for the EPOs for the mentioned periods through the use of the 
following formula:
AR(it) = ( ( P(it) -P(iO)) / P(iO) - ( I(t)-I(0) )/I(0 )) * 100 
where
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A R (it): the market adjusted price return o f stock i in t periods after the 
offering.
P(it) : the closing price o f stock i in t periods after the offering which is 
adjusted for the stocks dividends and splits if any.
P(iO) : the adjusted initial offering price o f stock i.
I(t) : the ISEC-100 market index at t periods after the corresponding offer.
1(0) : the ISEC-100 market index at the date o f offering each stock.
To test whether the new issues are underpriced or overpriced, the initial returns o f the 
IPOs must be adjusted. To do so for overall market movements, ISEC-100 index was selected 
as the proxy for the market. ISEC-100 index is a composite index including the most active 
100 companies listed on ISE. Each stock’s excess return, Eit, from the offer date to the market 
price observed at time t was computed in the following manner (Tınıç, 1988);
E(it) = In (P(it) / P(i0)) - In (I(t) /1(0)) 
where
E (it) ; the excess return of each stock i in t periods after the offer.
P (it) : the closing price o f each stock i in t periods after the offering which is 
adjusted for the stocks dividends and splits if any.
P(i0): the adjusted initial offering price of each stock i.
I(t) ; the ISEC-100 market index at t periods after the corresponding offer.
1(0); the ISEC-100 market index at the date o f offering each stock.
The procedure used to adjust for market returns in the formula assumes that beta 
coefficient o f the IPOs are all equal to one (Tımç, 1988). However, there are veiy good
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reasons to expect that the unseasoned new stocks would tend to be riskier than the existing 
stocks. Ibbotson (1975) documented that the volatility o f the IPOs is considerably larger than 
the market’s and that their beta coefficients tend to be large, particularly during the first two 
months following the offering date. Thus, the excess return, E(it), calculated in the formula 
provides a somewhat upward-biased estimate o f the initial performance of an IPO relative to 
the market. The existence o f abnormal returns in IPOs during the period under analysis was 
tested by t-statistics. The hypothesis is that at 0.05 level o f significance or less the excess 
return, Eit, is larger than zero.
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VI. RESULTS
The results o f the study are presented in two sections : short-term and medium-term 
price behaviors o f IPOs in 1994 and 1995 (Appendix B). In the first section, I have analyzed 
raw, adjusted and excess returns o f IPOs on the first, fifth, tenth and fifteenth trading day. The 
initial return characteristics for medium-term price behavior are analyzed on the first month 
and third month following the offer in the next section.
VI. 1. Short-Term  Price Behavior of IPOs
The average return o f 45 initial public offerings in 1994 and 1995 on the first day after 
the issue has been 7.44% with a standard deviation of 10.80%. During the same period, ISE 
market index had an average return o f 2.06% with a variability of 14.22%. The average of 
market adjusted return on the first day after the issue was 5.37% with a standard deviation of 
12.58% in the same period. The average return on the first day after the issue o f 24 IPOs in 
1994 and 21 IPOs in 1995 has been 8.44% and 6.29%, respectively. The ISE market index in 
1994 had higher average return than the index return in 1995. However, the market adjusted 
initial returns o f IPOs in 1994 was less than the market adjusted returns in 1995. The highest 
abnormal return on the first trading day, 26.65%, belongs to Otokar, whereas the investor who 
bought Alternatifbank had a loss o f 14.26% on the first day. Roughly, one fifth o f the sample 
was overpriced, while 73.3% o f the sample had positive abnormal first day returns. Three out 
o f forty-five companies had zero return on the first day following the offer. To test whether 
the stocks are underpriced or overpriced on the first day, the first step is to calculate the excess
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return of the individual IPOs in 1994 and 1995. The excess returns o f new issues from the 
offering date to first trading date averaged to 0.0563 with a variability of 0.1224. The null 
hypothesis that mean excess return of the sample is zero can be rejected at the 0.05 level of 
significance. The t-statistic is equal to 3.089 with 44 degrees of freedom. Hence it can be 
concluded that IPOs in ISE during 1994 and 1995 are underpriced.
Table 1. The performance of IPOs on the first trading day following the offer.
Return (%) Index Return (%) Adjusted Return (%)
Year 94 95 94«&95 94 95 94«&95 94 95 94&95
Mean 8.44 6.29 7.44 3.63 0.27 2.06 4.81 6.02 5.37
Std.Dev 10.18 11.61 10.80 18.43 6.92 14.22 14.95 9.50 12.58
Excess Return 1994 1995 1994 & 1995
Mean 0.0631 0.0488 0.0563
Std.Deviation 0.1567 0.0817 0.1224
T-Statistic 1.888 2.741 3.089
The second investigation of the short-term price behavior is on the weekly returns of 
new issues during the same period. Initially, I have analyzed returns o f IPOs from the date of 
the offering to the date o f five successive days following the first trading day. The first weekly 
return o f 45 IPOs in 1994 and 1995 averaged to 9.47% with a variability o f 25.13%. During 
the period under analysis, the average weekly return of ISE market index was 1.66% with a 
standard deviation o f 13.11%. The average and standard deviation o f market adjusted return 
for the first week have been 7.81% and 17.76%, respectively. As in the case of the first day 
abnormal return, the average first week return of 24 companies in 1994 was considerable
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higher than the average weekly return o f companies in 1995. This is also valid for both 
average weekly index return and average weekly market adjusted return. The lucky investor 
in Kerevita? realized an abnormal return o f 104.17% in the first week, the highest return for 
the period. The biggest loser in the first week was Ihlas Holding with 36% negative return. 
One fourth o f the sample had a negative return at the end o f the first week, while the 
remainings were underpriced. The excess returns o f the new issues from the offering date to 
the date of first week later than initial trading day averaged to 0.0579 with a standard deviation 
of 0.1507. As in the case of the first day abnormal return, the mean excess returns of IPOs for 
the first week is statistically different from zero at 0.05 level of significance. The t-statistic is 
equal to 2.579 with 44 degrees of freedom. It can be inferred that IPOs in 1994 and 1995 are 
underpriced regarding the performance of the new issues one week later than the initial 
trading date.
Table 2. The performance of IPOs on the fifth trading day following the offer.
Return (%) Index Return (%) Adjusted Return (%)
Year 94 95 94&95 94 95 94&95 94 95 94&95
Mean 13.70 4.63 9.47 2.46 0.73 1.66 11.23 3.90 7.81
Std.Dev 31.06 15.28 25.13 16.23 8.57 13.11 19.67 14.80 17.76
Excess Return 1994 1995 1994 & 1995
Mean 0.0837 0.0239 0.0579
Std.Deviation 0.1705 0.1299 0.1507
T-Statistic 2.302 0.842 2.579
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The third analysis o f IPOs during 1994 and 1995 is related with the performance of the 
stocks after ten successive days following the first trading date. The average return of the new 
issues on the tenth day following the initial trading day has been 7.30% with a variability of 
38.56%. The market index during the same period had average return o f 2.85% with a 
standard deviation 16.56% for two weeks. The average and standard deviation o f market 
adjusted returns o f IPOs for ten days were 4.45% and 26.93%, respectively. Kerevitaş has the 
highest return of 150% while Yapı Kredi Leasing has the lowest return o f 59.17% for the same 
period. Twenty out o f forty-five companies had negative returns during 1994 and 1995. For 
the second week, there exists a considerable decrease in the average return o f new issues, from 
11.56% in 1994 to 2.44% in 1995. The mean excess return o f IPOs for the second week was 
0.0013 with a standard deviation o f 0.2046. Unlike the prior findings, IPOs are neither 
underpriced nor overpriced for the second week. The related t-statistics was 0.0427 
insignificant at the level o f 0.05.
Table 3. The performance of IPOs on the tenth trading day following the olTer.
Return (%) Index Return (%) Adjusted Return (%)
Year 94 95 94&95 94 95 94&95 94 95 94«&95
Mean 11.56 2.44 7.30 2.83 2.87 2.85 8.73 -0.44 4.45
Std.Dev 50.83 15.89 38.56 20.77 1034 16.56 34.97 11.93 26.93
Excess Return 1994 1995 1994 & 1995
Mean 0.0087 -0.0109 0.0013
Std.Deviation 0.2721 0.1175 0.2046
T-Statistic 0.1506 -0.4252 0.0427
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In the third week after their offer, the initial public offerings had an average return of 
2.31% with a high variability o f 36.33%. The average o f market index return was 3.84% with 
a standard deviation o f 17.76%. The market adjusted return for the third week following the 
first trading day had a mean o f -1.54% and standard deviation of 25.56%. The number 
companies having positive and negative returns at the end of third week is 24 and 21, 
respectively. The average return o f IPOs in 1995 was almost zero whereas new issues had an 
average return o f 4.34% in 1994. Considering the performance of companies on the third 
week. Yapı Kredi Leasing was loss leader and Kerevitaş was gain leader. The mean excess 
return for the third week was -0.0621 with a standard deviation o f 0.2491. The related t- 
statistic was -1.673, insignificant at level o f 0.05. According to the test results, the new issues 
are neither overpriced nor underpriced on the fifteenth day following the initial trading day.
Table 4. The performance of IPOs on the third week after the initial trading.
Return (%) Index Return (%) Adjusted Return (%)
Year 94 95 94&95 94 95 94«fc95 94 95 94&95
Mean 4.34 -0.02 2.31 3.45 4.29 3.84 0.89 -4.31 -1.54
Std.Dev 46.71 19.60 36.33 20.83 13.95 17.76 31.35 17.09 25.56
Excess Return 1994 1995 1994 & 1995
Mean -0.0946 -0.0392 -0.0621
Std.Deviation 0.3085 0.1832 0.2491
T-Statistic -1.439 -0.981 -1.673
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Regarding the initial return characteristics o f IPOs in ISE during 1994 and 1995, new 
issues were underpriced on the first trading day and first week following the first trading date. 
However, IPOs were neither underpriced nor overpriced on the tenth and fifteenth trading days 
following the first trading day.
VI. 2. M edium -Term Price Behavior of IPOs
To analyze price behavior o f IPOs during 1994 and 1995 in the medium-term, I have 
investigated the return characteristics o f the stocks. Although investments in one month and 
three months can be regarded as short-term investments in developed securities markets, these 
durations are regarded as medium terms for the investors especially investing in new issues in 
ISE. The volatility o f the market, speculative price movements and the influence o f reflections 
of economic and political uncertainty in Turkey on ISE are the main factors that change the 
nature o f the investment terms.
The average return o f 45 initial public offerings on the first month after the first trading 
date has been -1.93% with a standard deviation o f 34.75%. During the same period, ISE 
market index had an average return o f 5.26% with a variability of 18.69%. The average of 
market adjusted return on the first month was -7.19% with a standard deviation of 26.76% in 
the same period. The average return o f 24 IPOs in 1994 and 21 IPOs in 1995 on the first 
month has been -5.22% and 1.82%, respectively. The ISE market index in 1995 had higher 
average return than the index return in 1994. The market adjusted initial returns o f IPOs in 
1995 was higher than new issues in 1994. The highest abnormal return on the first month, 
133.33%, belongs to Kerevitaş, whereas the investor who bought Yapı Kredi Leasing had a 
loss of 70.83% on the first month. 57.7% o f the sample was overpriced, while the remainings
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had positive abnormal monthly returns. The excess returns of new issues in the first month 
averaged to -0.120 with a variability o f 0.292. The null hypothesis that mean excess return of 
the sample is zero can be rejected at the 0.05 level of significance since the t-statistic is equal 
to -2.754 with 44 degrees o f freedom. Hence it can be concluded that IPOs in ISE during 
1994 and 1995 are not underpriced considering the first month performance. If the alternative 
hypothesis is revised for testing overpricing o f new issues during same period, that is excess 
monthly return o f stocks is negative at significance level o f 0.05, it can inferred that 
overpricing o f IPOs exists at the end o f first month following the initial trading day.
Tabic 5. The performance of IPOs on the first month after the first trading day.
Return (%) Index Return (%) Adjusted Return (%)
Year 94 95 94&95 94 95 94&95 94 95 94«&95
Mean -5.22 1.82 -1.93 3.32 7.47 5.26 -8.54 -5.65 -7.19
Std.Dev 42.74 22.98 34.75 18.80 18.76 18.69 33.64 16.42 26.76
Excess Return 1994 1995 1994 & 1995
Mean -0.1783 -0.0672 -0.120
Std.Deviation 0.3876 0.1518 0.292
T-Statistic -2.157 -2.028 -2.754
The last investigation is related to the performance o f IPOs in the third month after 
their offer. The initial public offerings had an average return o f 7.65% with a high variability 
of 44.51%. The average o f market index return was 10.86% with a standard deviation of 
27.63%. The market adjusted return for the third month following the first trading day had a 
mean of -3.20% and standard deviation o f 34.81%. The number companies having positive
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and negative returns at the end o f third month is 22 and 23, respectively. The average return 
of IPOs for the third month following the first trading day in 1995 was 14.66% whereas new 
issues had an average return o f 1.52% in 1994. Comparing the performance of companies on 
the third month, Milpa was loss leader and Frigo Pak was gain leader. The mean excess return 
for the third month was -0.1034 with a standard deviation of 0.3886. The related t-statistic 
was -1.786, significant at level o f 0.05. According to the test results, the new issues are 
overpriced on the third month after the initial trading day.
Table 6. The performance of IPOs on the third month following the offer.
Return (%) Index Return (%) Adjusted Return (%)
Year 94 95 94&95 94 95 94&95 94 95 94&95
Mean 1.52 14.66 7.65 10.94 10.76 10.86 -9.42 3.90 -3.20
Std.Dev 43.64 45.52 44.51 23.19 32.58 27.63 33.94 35.24 34.81
Excess Return 1994 1995 1994 & 1995
Mean -0.2218 -0.0122 -0.1034
Std.Deviation 0.4322 0.3162 0.3886
T-Statistic -2.407 -0.177 -1.786
Considering the results of the tests for medium-term price behavior, it can be concluded 
that a consistent return characteristic of IPOs in 1994 and 1995 is observed as a whole, that is, 
overpricing exists for new issues after the first month following the initial trading date.
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In our study which was aimed at analyzing the initial return characteristics of IPOs in 
ISE during 1994 and 1995, we have important drawbacks about the performance of new issues 
in the short and medium term. The structure, advantages, disadvantages, Turkish experience 
of IPOs are the other topics encountered in the study.
The existence of significant abnormal positive initial returns o f IPOs in 1994 and 1995 
on the first and fifth trading day showed that the new issues are underpriced. The excess 
returns for initial offerings were found to be significantly larger than zero. However, no 
significant excess returns are observed for the second and third week following the initial 
trading date. The absence o f significant abnormal initial returns in the IPO market in ISE 
during the same period seems to suggest that new issues follow the general market movement. 
The overpricing of IPOs on the first month and third month after the initial trading date was 
proven by the existence o f significant abnormal negative initial returns. The observed high 
variability indicates that there might be some stocks that are underpriced while there might be 
some stocks that are overpriced. High uncertainty around the intrinsic values, especially in the 
economic environment o f Turkey, might be responsible for the high initial returns and losses 
observed for some new issues in the short and medium term. Segmentation according to risk 
class, issuer type, size, industry and price group might also help to explain abnormal initial 
returns observed for some stocks. However, the number o f IPOs in ISE during the period 
under analysis does not present itself suitable for such grouping.
VU. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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The existing limitations in our study are mainly due to the nature o f ISE. The political 
and economic uncertainty in our country, especially Austerity Package on April 4,1994 and 
general election on December 24,1995, were the main factors that had considerable reflections 
on financial markets. The happenings in the alternative investment instruments, interest rates 
and foreign exchange rates, had strong influences on the market during the period under 
analysis. The volatile, small and less liquid market, low information usage, low information 
conveyed by financial tables and price manipulation in the aftermarket are the general 
characteristics inherent in ISE are the other limitations faced in the study.
Considering the importance o f the topic both from the perspective o f investors, firms 
going public and investment banker, further studies are needed to identify sources of variation 
in IPOs. The recommended studies may be on long-run performance o f IPOs, the reasons of 
underpricing, underwriter price support, underwriter reputation and its impact on the pricing, 
the choice of the offering method in IPOs and the firm value.
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APPENDIX A.
INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS IN ISTANBUL STOCK EXCHANGE
DURING 1994 AND 1995
APPENDIX A.l. IPOs IN ISTANBUL STOCK EXCHANGE IN 1994
NAME OF COMPANY SALE TYPE OFFERING STRUCTURE UNDERWRITER OFFERING METHOD
TRANSTÜRK FREN D O N AN IM RECEIVING OFFER FOR PRICE SALE B Y  A  SHAREHOLDER İKTİSAT BANKASI UNDERW RITING
EM SAN  PASLANM AZ ÇELİK BOOKBUILDING B Y  FIXED PRICE C APH A L  INCREASE YATIRIMB.-WK BEST EFFORT
MİLPA TİC. VE SA N. ÜRÜNLER RECEIVING OFFER FOR PRICE SALE B Y  A  SHAREHOLDER TEB. UNDERW RITING
ATLAS M .K .Y .0 BOOKBUILDING B Y  FIXED PRICE C APH AL INCREASE GLOBAL B EST EFFORT
YAPI KREDİ LEASING RECEIVING OFFER FOR PRICE SALE B Y  A  SHAREHOLDER YAPI KREDİ B AN K A SI UNDERW RITING
İHLAS HOLDİNG RECEIVING OFFER FOR PRICE CAPITAL INCREASE FİNANSBANK BEST  EFFORT
SA BA H  PAZARLAM A BOOKBUILDING B Y  FIXED PRICE SALE B Y  A  SHAREHOLDER INTERBANK UNDERW RITING
EGEPLAST EGEPLASTİK RECEIVING OFFER FOR PRICE SALE B Y  A  SHAREHOLDER GLOBAL UNDERWTOTING
ÇUM RA KAĞIT RECEIVING OFFER FOR PRICE C APH AL INCREASE YATIRIMBANK BEST EFFORT
KEREVİTAŞ GIDA SA N A Y İ RECEIVING OFFER FOR PRICE C APH AL INCREASE GLOBAL B EST EFFORT
DARDANEL Ö N ENTA Ş GIDA RECEIVING OFFER FOR PRICE CAPHAL INCREASE GLOBAL BEST  EFFORT
B U G Ü N  YAYINCILIK A .Ş. BOO KBUILDING B Y  FDCED PRICE SALE B Y  A  SHAREHOLDER KARON UNDERW RITING
M UTLU A K Ü  VE MALZEMELERİ RECEIVING OFFER FOR PRICE SALE B Y  A  SHAREHOLDER KARON UNDERW RITING
B O R U SA N  BİRLEŞİK BO R U RECEIVING OFFER FOR PRICE SALE B Y  A  SHAREHOLDER FİNANSBANK UNDERWTOTING
M ERKO GIDA SA N A Y İ RECEIVING OFFER FOR PRICE SALE B Y  A  SHAREHOLDER FİNANSBANK UNDERWTOTING
VİKİNG KAĞIT VE SELÜLOZ RECEIVING OFFER FOR PRICE SALE B Y  A  SHAREHOLDER GLOBAL UNDERW RITING
K ARSU TEKSTİL SA NA Yİ SALE IN THE STOCK EXCHANGE CAPHAL INCREASE T. KALKINMA BAN K A SI BEST EFFORT
HALK SİGORTA RECEIVING OFFER FOR PRICE SALE B Y  A  SHAREHOLDER YAPI KREDİ BANKASI BEST EFFORT
ANA DO LU  BİRACILIK RECEIVING OFFER FOR PRICE SALE B Y  A SHAREHOLDER INTERBANK UNDERWTUTTNG
G ÜNEŞ SİGORTA RECEIVING OFFER FOR PRICE SALE B Y  A  SHAREHOLDER VAKIFLAR BANKASI UNDERW RITING
TUK AŞ TURGUTLU KONSERVECİLİ RECEIVING OFFER FOR PRICE SALE B Y  A  SHAREHOLDER OYAK UNDERW RITING
AKSİGORTA BOOKBUILDING B Y  FIXED PRICE SALE B Y  A  SHAREHOLDER GLOBAL UNDERW RITING
RAKS e l e k t r i k l i  E V  ALETLERİ RECEIVING OFFER FOR PRICE CAPITAL INCREASE GARANTİ YATIRIM UNDERWTUITNG
SÖNM EZ PAM UK LU SANAYİ RECEIVING OFFER FOR PRICE SALE B Y  A  SHAREHOLDER KÖRFEZBANK UNDERW RITING
ÇEM TAŞ ç e l i k  M AKİNA S/JLE IN THE STOCK EXCHANGE SALE B Y  A  SHAREHOLDER İKTİSAT BANKASI UNDERWTUTING
NAMb Uh COMPANY llPODATE [FIRST TRADING DATE:NO OF SHARES FREE-FLOAT:AMOUNT SOLD ¡PRICE REALISED1
1 (%)
1. 1 — 
(THOUSAND TLV
TRANSTURK  FREN D O N A N IM 02-03.12.1993 03 .0 1 .1 9 9 4  i 4 ,780 ,032 20 .00 76,480,512 М Ш -14000 16,000
E M SA N  PASLANM AZ ÇELİK 13-15.1993 2 4 .01 .1994 12,200,000 2 8 .37 119,560,000 9,800 9,800
M İLPA TİC. VE SA N. Ü RÜ N L E R 24-25 .01 .1994 15.02.1994 5 ,400 ,000 15.00 243,000,000 M IN -45000 45,000
ATLAS M .K .Y .0 25-27 .01 .1994 2 8 .02 .1994 55 ,000 ,000 84.61 77,000,000 1,400 1,400
YAPI ÎÜ ^ D İ  LEASING 21-24 .01 .1994 2 8 .02 .1994 30 ,000 ,000 15.00 180,000,000 M IN-3000 6,000
IHLAS HOLDİNG 7-18 .02 .1994 16.03.1994 14,042,000 18.23 702,100,000 M IN-50000 50,000
SA B A H  PAZARLAM A 2-4 .03 .1994 23 .03 .1994 9 ,625 ,000 38.50 134,750,000 14,000 14,000
EGEPLAST EGEPLASTÖC 3-4 .03 .1994 20 .04 .1994 7 ,500 ,000 15.00 54,000,000 M IN -7200 7,200
Ç Ü M R A  KAĞIT 11-12-13.05.1994 2 0 .06 .1994 3 ,700 ,000 9.32 59,200,000 M IN-16000 16,000
KEREVTTAŞ GIDA SANAYİ 12-13.05.1994 20 .0 6 .1 9 9 4 8 ,000 ,000 2 8 .57 192,000,000 M IN-22500 24,000
D AR D A N E L  ÖNENTAŞ GIDA 28-29 .07 .1994 2 2 .08 .1994 12,000,000 37.50 780,000,000 M N -5 0 0 0 0 65,000
B Ü G Ü N  YAYINCILIK A .Ş. 03-04-05 .08 .1994 0 1 .09 .1994 20 ,000 ,000 20 .00 90,000,000 4,500 4,500
M Ü TL Ü  A K Ü  VE M ALZEM ELERİ 24-25 .08 .1994 12.09.1994 11,250,000 15.00 506,250,000 M IN -30000 45,000
B O R Ü SA N  BİRLEŞİK B O R U 01-02 .09 .1994 12 .09.1994 30 ,000 ,000 20 .00 690,000,000 M IN -20000 23,000
M ERKO GIDA SANAYİ 06-07 .10 .1994 20 .1 0 .1 9 9 4 36 ,000 ,000 15.00 180,000,000 MTNM500 5,000
VİKİNG KAĞIT VE SELÜLOZ 13-14.10.1994 2 4 .1 0 .1 9 9 4 12,600,000 31.50 252,000,000 M IN-20000 20,000
K A R SU  TEKSTİL SANAYİ 14-15-16-17.11.1994 17.11.1994 11,200,000 8.62 113,551,000 M 3N-9000 10,138
HALK s i g o r t a 19-20.10.1994 0 7 .11 .1994 56 ,000 ,000 16.00 560.000,000 M IN-10000 10,000
A N A D O L U  BİRACILIK 16-17.11.1994 28 .1 1 .1 9 9 4 90 ,000 ,000 25.71 405,000,000 M IN-4200 4,500
G Ü N EŞ SİGORTA 14-15-16.11.1994 28 .11 .1 9 9 4 18,750,000 15.00 318,750,000 M IN-17000 17,000
TUK AŞ TÜRGUTLÜ KONSERVECİLİK 22-23 .11 .1994 0 5 .12 .1994 14,175,000 15.00 304,762,500 M IN-20000 21,500
AKSİGORTA 23-24 .11 .1994 0 5 .12 .1994 75 ,000 ,000 15.00 675,000,000 9,000 9,000
RAK S e l e k t r i k l i  E V  ALETLERİ 06-07 .12 .1994 19.12.1994 15,000,000 30.00 247,500,000 M IN-16500 16,500
SÖNM EZ PAM UKLU SANAYİ 12-13.12.1994 2 6 .12 .1994 145,000,000 20.00 580,000,000 4.000 4 non
ÇEM TAŞ ç e l i k  M AKİNA 26-30 .12 .1994 30 .12 .1994 11,520,000 20.00 142,761,000
 ^ . p w w w
10,500 ! 13,500
APPENDIX A.2. IPOs IN ISTANBUL STOCK EXCHANGE IN 1995
NAME OF COMPANY SALE TYPE OFFERING STRUCTURE |UNDERWRITER |OFFERING METHOD
RANT FINANSAL KİRALAMA A.Ş. BOOK BUILDING BY FIXED PRICE CAPITAL INCREASE ATA M .K. UNDERWRITING
GÖLTAŞ ÇİMENTO A.Ş. RECEIVING OFFER FOR PRICE CAPITAL INCREASE GLOBAL UNDERWRITING
BATIÇIM ÇİMENTO RECEIVING OFFER FOR PRICE CAPITAL INCREASE TEB BEST EFFORT
SÖKTAŞ BOOK BUILDING BY FIXED PRICE CAPITAL INCREASE FlNANSBANK UNDERWRITING
ERBOSAN BORU SALE IN THE STOCK EXCHANGE CAPITAL INCREASE GARANTİ YATIRIM BEST EFFORT
OTOKAR BOOK BUILDING BY FIXED PRICE SALE BY A SHAREHOLDER TEB UNDERWRITING
FRIGO-PAK GIDA MADDELERİ BOOK BUILDING BY FIXED PRICE CAPITAL INCREASE/ SALE BY A SHAREHOLDER FlNANSBANK UNDERWRITING
ÇBS BOYA KİMYA BOOK BUILDING BY FIXED PRICE CAPITAL INCREASE FlNANSBANK UNDERWRITING
GLOBAL MENKUL DEĞERLER RECEIVING OFFER FOR PRICE CAPITAL INCREASE VAKIFLAR UNDERWRITING
ARDEM BOOK BUILDING BY FIXED PRICE SALE BY A SHAREHOLDER KOÇBANK UNDERWRITING
ESEM SPOR GİYİM ¡RECEIVING OFFER FOR PRICE SALE BY A SHAREHOLDER GARANTİ YATIRIM UNDERWRITING
COMMERCIAL UNION SİGORTA ¡BOOK BUILDING BY FIXED PRICE CAPITAL INCREASE/ SALE BY A SHAREHOLDER FlNANSBANK UNDERWRITING
ECZACIBAŞI YAPI BOOK BUILDING BY FIXED PRICE SALE BY A SHAREHOLDER ECZACIBAŞI M.K. UNDERWRITING
TÜMTEKS BOOK BUILDING BY FIXED PRICE SALE BY A SHAREHOLDER FlNANSBANK UNDERWRITING
NERGİS HOLDİNG RECEIVING OFFER FOR PRICE CAPITAL INCREASE GLOBAL UNDERWRITING
ALTERNATİFBANK BOOK BUILDING BY FIXED PRICE CAPITAL INCREASE FlNANSBANK UNDERWRITING
BOSSA BOOK BUILDING BY FIXED PRICE SALE BY A SHAREHOLDER FlNANSBANK UNDERWRITING
KAPLAMIN BOOK BUILDING BY FIXED PRICE CAPITAL INCREASE INTERBANK UNDERWRITING
ADANA ÇİMENTO SALE IN THE STOCK EXCHANGE SALE BY A SHAREHOLDER OYAK M.K UNDERWRITING
EMİNİŞ AMBALAJ SALE IN THE STOCK EXCHANGE SALE BY A SHAREHOLDER INTERBANK UNDERWRITING
HAZNEDAR ATEŞ TUĞLA BOOK BUILDING BY FIXED PRICE ¡CAPITAL INCREASE/ SALE BY A SHAREHOLDER TEB UNDERWRITING
RANT FINANSAL KİRALAMA A.Ş.
GÛLTAŞ ÇİMENTO A.Ş,
BATIÇIM ÇİMENTO
SÖKTAŞ
ERBOSAN BORU
OTOKAR
FRIGO-PAK GIDA MADDELERİ
ÇBS BOYA KİMYA
GLOBAL MENKUL DEĞERLER
ARDEM
ESEM SPOR GİYİM
COMMERCIAL UNION SİGORTA
ECZACIBAŞI YAPI
TÜMTEKS
NERGİS HOLDİNG
ALTERNATIFBANK
BOSSA
KAPLAMIN
ADANA ÇİMENTO
EMİNİŞ AMBALAJ
HAZNEDAR ATEŞ TUĞLA
07-0 8.02.1996
23-24.02.1995
09-10.03.1995
23-24.03.1995
10-14.04.1995
13-14.04.1995
06-07.04.1995
27-28.04.1995
02-03.05.1995
16-17.05.1995
23-24.05.1995
08-09.06.1995
15-16.06.1995
14-15.06.1996
08-09.06.1995
22-23.06.1995
10-11.08.1995
23-24.08.1995
09-11.10,1995
13-15.12.1995
30.11.1995-01.12.1995
FIRST TRADING DATE
20.02.1995
06.03.1995
20.03.1995
03.04.1995
17.04.1995
24.04.1995
24.04.1995
15.05.1995
22.05.1995
29.05.1995
05.06.1995
20.06.1995
26,06.1995
26.06.1996
26.06.1997
03.07.1995
21.08.1995
04.09.1995
12.10.1995
18.12.1995
11.12.1995
NO OF SHARES
25,000,000
33,600,000
32,000,000
12,500,000
16,750,000
16,000,000
11,250,000
38,800,000
115,000,000
36,000,000
40,000,000
22,500,000
300,000,000
35,000,000
120,000,000
180,000,000
270,000,000
25,000,000
3,800,000
6,000,000
22,500,000
FREE-FLOAT
(%)
25.00
13.22
7.80
15.63
11.55
20.00
28.13
29.85
16.43
15.00
16.00
15.00
30.00
31.82
16.67
20.00
15.00
16.67
0.99
15.00
18.00
AMOUNTSOLD
(THOUSAND TL)
70,000,000
252,000,000
416,000,000
187,500,000
110,125,000
408,000,000
174,375,000
263,840,000
PRICE
2800
7500
12000
15000
MIN-5500
25500
15500
6800
1,121,250,000 16000
612,000,000 17000
480,000,000 111000
309,375,000 113750
1,950,000,000
402,500,000
840.000. 000
630.000. 000
1,215,000,000
287,500,000
74,500,000
91,438,750
6500
11500
7000
3500
4500
11500
18000
15000
5000
REALISED
2800
7500
13000
15000
5500-7500
25500
15500
6800
9750
17000
12000
13750
6500
11500
7000
3500
4500
11500
19000-21000
15000-16000
APPENDIX B.
RESULTS FOR THE W HOLE SAMPLE
RETURN OF IPOs IN 1994
COMPANY NAME DATE 1 DAY 5 DAYS 10 DAYS 15 DAYS 1 MONITI 3 M ONniS
TRÂNSTÜRK FREN 03-Dec-93 10.94% 65.62% 150.00% 75.00% 18.75% -20.31%
EMSAN PASLANMAZ 15-Dec-93 10.20% 4.59% -21.43% -51.02% -35.71% -58.16%
YAPI KREDİ l e a s in g ' 24-Jan-94 -10.00% -28.34% -59.17% '-'69.17% -70.83% -66.96%
MİLPÂ 25-Jan-94 -10.00% -34.44% -54.45% -60.56% -63.90% -8İ.56%
IHLAS HOLDING 18-Feb-94 -10.00% -36.00% -52.00% -38.00% -63.00% -57.76%
EGEPLAST 04-Mar-94 11.12% 15.28% 1.36% -8.32% -30.56% 94.44%
SABAH PAZARLAMA 04-Mar-94 21.67% 43.33% 53.33% 9Ö.ÖÖ% 46.67®7o 43.33%
Ç'ÛMRA 13-May-94 10.94% 43.75% 28.13% 28.13% 10.94% 12.50%
KEREVİTAŞ 13-May-94 10.42% 104.17% 150.00% 133.33% 133.33% 37.‘5Ö%
d â r d 'a'n e l 29-JUİ-94 23.06% 24.60% 12.30% -4.63% -0.01% "  -'18.47%
BUGÜN YAYINCILIK 05-Aug-94 1.11% 2.28% -18.18% -39.77% -45.45% -45.45%
MUTLÜ AKÜ 25-Aug-94 0.83% -30.54% -24.94% -33.90% -40.62% 51.69%
b o r u s 'a n Ö2-Sep-94 21.67% 0.86% 24.90% 12.88% 22.50% 39^31%
MERKO 07-Oct-94 11.97% 5.97% -8.03% -1.03% 1.97% 1.97%
VİKİNG KAĞIT 14-Oct-9'4 0.00% 22.87% -1.1 Ö% ■"'-7.11% -10.10% ‘:25:08®/o
ha'l k ' s İg o r t â 20-Oct-94 10.00% 14.99% 14799% 14799% Î7.46% '.......  22749%
GÜNEŞ SİGORTA I6-NOV-94 2.94% 3.99% -9.77% -9.77% -11.30% 25.4'Ö%
ANA'DOLÛ BİRA' I7-N0V-94 7.78% 24.76% 30.14% 23.76% 21.21% 7.18%
KÂR'SU TEKSTİL I7-N0V-94 21.21% 21.21% 28.95% 39.26% 26.37% 13.47%
tû k â 'ş 23-NOV-94 9.35% 16.33% 9.35% 11.68% 7.03% -4.63%
ÂKSİĞÖRTA 24-N0V-94 25.70% 15.74% 19.48% 10.76% -10.4'Ö% -1.68%
R'ÂKS e v  ALETLERİ 07-bec-94 11.59% 4.66% 1.49% -11.20% -22.30% -15.95%
SÖNMEZ PAMÜKLÛ 13-D6C-94 10.00% 11.51% -3.69% -1.16% -17.63% 62.18%
ÇEMTAS 30-Dec-94 0.00% 11.53% 5.77% 0.00% -9.62% 21.Î5%
AVERAGE 8.44% 13.70% 11.56% 4.34% -5.22% 1.52%
STD d e v iâ t io ' n '10.18% 31.06% 50.83% 46.71% 42.74% 43.64%
RETURN OF IPOs IN 1995
COMPANY NAME DAİE 1 DAY 5 DAYS 10 DAYS 15 DAYS 1 MONTH 3 MON ITIS
RANT Ö8-Feb-95 7.14% 1.79% 12.‘50% 25.00% 28757% 39.29%
GÖLTÂŞ ÇİMENTO 24-Feb-95 10.34% 3.45% 12.07% “ 25.86“% 34.48% 64.66%
BATİ ÇİMENTO l'O-Mar-95 14.44% 14.81% 12;'87% 10.41% " 37752% “2“l. l0 %
SOKTAS 24-Mar-95 7.14®/o 21.43% 30.36% “■25.00% ■ 3r05% 54.18%
FRİGO PAK _Ö7:Apr-95 22.58% 22.58% 19.35% l7 . “74% 1.61% 112.90%
ERBOSAN 14-Apr-95 17.78% 19.44% -f.T i% 11.11% 3.33% .......... 13“89%
OTOKAR 14-Apr-95 26.65% 26.65% “'22.63% -3.5“0% -1.49% 56.81%
ÇBS BOYA 28-Apr-95 10.61% -4.14% 0.28% -1.19% -2.67% “3.'2“3%
GLOBAL Ö3-May-95 -5.13% 1.54% -6767% -23.Ö“8'% -2 l l8 % “-■58“46%
ÂRDEM 17-May-95 -7.97% -12.04% - 12.64% ■“ “-1'2.04% -17.45% -5.50%
e 's e m s p o r 24-May-95 2.08% 10.42% 4.17% -2.08% -16.67% -14.58%
COMMERCIAL UNION Ö9-Jun-95 -0.17% -5.62% -20.14% -27.40% -21.95% -35.38%
NERGİS 09-Jun-95 -7.14% -12.86% -İ4.'29% -20.00% -17.14% -35.00%
TÛMTEKS 15-Jun-95 0.00% -23.48% ■'-25722% ■■-26.96% -8.7Ö% 4.35“%
EYÂP' 16-Jun-95 23.08% 12.31% " 15.38% 18.46% 16.92% 1.5“4%
AİTERNÂTİFB'ANK 23-Jun-95 -14.26% -21.41% -21.41% “-2“5.7Ö% -27.12% -42.13%
BOSSA 11-Aug-95 3 .67% 1.39% 5.95% 2.'53% -6.58% 2.53%
KAPLAMIN 24-Aug-95 4.20% -0.24% -4767% -6.89% 4.20% 17.49%
ADANA ÇİMENTO B 1î-Öct-95 -7.65% 6.15% -0.85% -0.85% -21.85% -31.18%
HAZNEDAR Oİ-Dec-95 22.00% 34.00% 26.00% 34.00% 50.00% 100.00%
EMİNİŞ 15-Dec-95 2.77% 1.08% -3.97% -20.82% -0.60% 38.14%
AVERAGE 6.29% 4.63% 2.44% -0.02% 1.82®/o 14.66%
STD DEVIÂTION 11.61% 15.28% 15.89% 19.60% 22.98% 45.52%
INDEX RETURN IN 1994
COMPANY NAME DATE 1 DAY 5 DAYS 10 DAYS 15 DAYS 1 MONTH 3 MONTHS
TRANSTÜRK FREN 03-Dec-93 21.77% 32.37% 60.20% 4'5.72'% 3.32% -8.59%
EMSAN PASLANMAZ 15-Dec-93 30.55% -0.11% -3.70% -25.4'd% -8.91% -6.09%
YAPI KREDİ LEASING 24-Jan-94 -39.81% -35.73% -40.19% -38.84% -41.41% -43.74%
MİLPA 25-Jan-94 -27.69% -24.10% -33.98% -33.61% -33.44% -31.87%
İHLAS HOLDİNG 18-Feb-94 -21.50% -23.01% -28.19% -9.20% 11.40% 0 .2 ¥ / o
eg¥ p a s t 04-Mar-94 32.37®/o 8.18% -2.96% '0.90% 5.34% 39.59%
SABAH PAZÂRLÂMÂ 04-Mar-94 13.02% 21.61% 31.37% 48.95®/b '32.5“8% 26.73%
ÇUMRA KAĞIT 13-May-94 27.32% 24.11®/o 23.78% 30.48% 39.04% 52.74%
KEREVİtAŞ 13-May-94 27.32% 24.11% ' “ 23.78% 30.48% 39.04®/o 52.74%
DARDÂNEL 29-ÜUİ-94 23.13% 21.29% l'9İ26% 11.08% ■ Î5.72% ■■'22.31 %
BUGÜN YAYI NGTLIK 05-Aug-94 16.53% 9.99% 8.90% ■" 9'.'97% 19.1'5% '28742%
MUTLU AKÜ 25-Aug-94 -5.77% -7.63% Ö.5Ö% 4.61% 4.7Ö% 12.37%
BORUSAN 02-Sep-94 -5.08% -6.96% 1.23% 5.37% 5.46% 13.19%
MERKO 07-ÖCI-94 -8.45% “ "-8.5'l% -7.11% ..... '-6.21% '  " '  -i.'57% -6.27%
v İkTn g 'k â ğ Tt  ......... 14¥c t-94 -11.69% -7.10% -5.98% -0.3'9% -f3 8 % -7.8'4'%
HALK SİGORTA 20-OCİ-94 3.28% 8.17% 9.26% 8735% ' 14728% "l9.'25%
GÜNEŞ'S İĞORTÂ'' 16-NOV-94 -0.32% 6.29% ' 4^60% “ ■■'T65% -0.31% 6.21%
ANADOLU BİRA 17-NOV-94 1.22% 7.94% 6.23% 3.23% 1.24% 7.86%
KARSU TEKSTİL“ 17-NOV-94 0.00% -0.64®/o 4.37% 5!5Ö% 2.74% '4.49%
T U IA Ş
AKSİĞÖRTA
23-NOV-94
‘ 24-N0V-94
6.80%
7.33%
6.91%
7.44'%
3.90%
4.42%
5.29% 
'2; 07%
1.25% 
' 'l'.75%
16.99%
Î7.57%
RAKS eV  aT e t l e r İ“ 07-D6C-94 -0.64% -0.84% -4.32% '-5.40'% -'97o'5% 22.5'5%
SÖNMEZ PAMÜKLÜ 13-Dec-94 -2.62% -4.31% -5.38% -6.79% -13.00% ■3'i.2'9%
ÇEMTAS 30-bec-94 0.00% -0.35% -2.14% -4.94% -8.17% -7.44%
AVERAGE 3.63% 2.46% 2.'83% '3.'45% 3.32% 10.94%
STD.DEVIATION 18.43% 16.23% 20 77% 20.83% 18.80% 23.19%
INDEX RETURN IN 1995
COMPANY NAME DATE 1 DAY 5 DAYS 10 DAYS 15 DAYS 1 MONTH 3 MONTHS
RANT 08-Feb-95 10.29% 12.91% 19.24% 24.66”% 32.64%
64.47%
GÖLTAŞ“ÇİMENT0 
BATİ ÇİMENTO
24-Feb-95 5.60% 11.82®/o Î3.74% 23.46% 49.04% _____ 75^24%
10-Mar-95 5.05% 10.41% 19.87% ” 34.27% 58.61 % 54.60%
SOKTAS 24-Mar-95 -12.35% -11.23% 12.24% 30.19%
Iİ.92% 24.04%
FRİGO PAK 07-Apr-95 11.32% 4.46% 14.80% -2.99% 5.99%
11.56% 
o:i4%
..  3.28%
T36%
-7.15%
ERBOSAN ___ ___ 14-Apr-95 2.85% 13.38% -3.29% 6.27%
3.y4“/o
■-T88%'
OTOKAR'  ______ 14-Apr-95 3.06% -3.29% 6İ27% -10.19%
ÇBS BOYA ■”28-Apr-95 7.80% -6.71% 1.52% 8.71%
8.26% 
”  7.13%
GLOBAL 03-May-95 -11.01% -4.4”1% 0.01% 10.55%
ÂRDEM 17-May-95
24-May-95
-5.18% -2.33% 7.96% 5.37% -3.47®7o -8.56%
IVI ________
ESEMSPÖR 
COMMERCfAL UNION
7.15% 13.71% 10.98% 12.İ5% 2.63% -0.69%
Ö9-Jun-95 -4.47% -2.97% -13.54% -13.86% -Î3.2Ö% -23.69%o  4 n /
NB=iGİS 09-Jun-95 -2.97% -10.32% -13.80% -10.25%
-4.87% -22.21%
TÜMTEKS 15-Jun-95 3.40% -4.43% -8.14% -4.35% 1.37% ”  -2.53%
-17.10%
-20-30%
EYAP 16-Jun-95 -0.58% -8.11% -11.68%
-8.04%
ALfERNÂTİFBANk 23-Jun-95 -12.34% -12.60% -9.00% -5.98®/o “5.85%
-18.47%
A "7 A 0/
BOSSA ____
KAPLAMIN ____
ADANA ÇİMENTO B
11 -Aug-95 -2.8"5% -0.75% 2.71% -1.28% “11.45% -4.71%
24-Aug-95 2.38% 0.35% -2.72% -9.61% -3.65%
-'12.16%
İÎ-Oct-95 -5.05% 8.20% 4.91% -1.26%1 -8.76%
2.03% 
^5927% 
64”96% 
-1 0  70% 
"32.58%
HAZNEDAR 01-Dec-95 1.57% 0.84% 7.37% 1.75%
13.13%
EMİNİŞ
AVERAGE”
STD.DEVrÂTIÖN
15-Dec-95 2.06% 6.47% 0.90% 0.44% 18.45%
0.27% 0.73% 2.87% '4.29% 7.47%
6.92% 8.57% 10.34% 13.95% 18.76%
ADJUSTED RETURN OF IPOs IN 1994
CO M PANY N AM K D ATE İD A Y 5 DAYS 10 DAYS 15 DAYS 1 M O N IT I 3 MONTHS
TRANSTÜRK FREN 3-Dec-93 -10.83% 33.26% 89.80% 29.28% 15.43% -11.730/
EMSAN PASLANMAZ 15-Dec-93 -20.35% 4.70% -17.73% -25.62% -26.80% -52.070/
YAPI KREDİ LEÂSİNG 24-Jan-94 29.81% 7.39% -18.98% -30.33% -29.42% -23.230/
MİLPA 25-Jan-94 17.69% -10.34% -20.46% -26.95% -30.46% -49.690/
İHLAS HOLDİNG 18-Feb-94 11.50% -12.99% -23.81% -28.80% -74.40% -58.Ö'lo/
EGEPLÂST 4-Mar-94 -21.26% 7.10% 4.32% -9.23% -35.90% 54.860/
SABAH PAZARLAMA 4-Mar-94 8.64% 21.72% 21.96% 41.05% 14.09% 16.610/
ÇUMRA İ^ 'Ğ IT “....... 13-May-94 -16.38% 19.64% 4.35% -2.35% -28.11% -40.240/
KEREVİTAŞ 13-May-94 -16.90% 80.06% 126.22% 102.86% 9A29% :i5.24o/
DARDANEL 29-JUİ-94 -0.06% 3.31% -6.96% -15.71% -15.73%  ^ -40J8^
BUGÜN YAYINCILIK 5-Aug-94 -15.43% -7.72% -27.07% -49.74% -64.60% -73.870/
MÜTLU AKÜ 25-Aug-94 6.60% -22.91% -25.44% -38.51% -45.32% 39.320/
BORUSÂN 2-Sep-94 26.75% 7.82% 23.67% 7.50% 17.04% 26.120/
MERKO 7-Oct-94 20.42% 14.48% -0.92% 5.19% 3.54% 8.240/
VİKİNG KAĞIT..................... l'4-Oct-9'4 11.69% 29.97% 4.88% -6.72% -8.72% .......-17.'24o/
HALK SİGORTA 20-Oct-94 6.72% 6.82% 5.73% 6.64% 3.18% 3.240/
GÜNEŞ SİGORTA I6-N0V-94 3.26% -2.30% -14.37% -11.43% -1İ.ÖÖ% 19.19%
ANADOLU BİRA I7-N0V-94 6.55% 16.82% 23.92% 20.53% 19.97% -O.680/0
KARSU TEKSTİL I7-N0V-94 21.21% 21.85% 24.58% 33.76% 23.62% 8.98%
TÛKAŞ 23-N0V-94 2.56% 9.42% 5.45% 6.39% 5.78% -21.61%
ÂkSİGORTA 24-N0V-94 18.37% 8.30% 15.06% 8.69% -12.14% -19.240/c
RAKS EV ALETLERİ 7-Dec-94 12.24% 5.50% 5.81% -5.80% -13.25% -38.51%
SÖNMEZ PAMUKLÜ"“ 13-Dec-94 12.62% 15.82% 1.69% 5.6'4% -4.63% 30.890/c
ÇEMTAS 30-D6C-94 0.00% 11.88% 7.91% 4.94% -1.45% 28.59%
â v e r â g e “ 4.81% 11.23% 8.73% 0.89% -8.54% -9.42%
STD.DEVIATION" 14.95% 19.67% 34.97% 31.35% 33.64% 33.94%
ADJUSTED RETURN OF IPOs IN 1995
COMPANY NAME DATE 1 DAY 5 DAYS 10 DAYS 15 DAYS 1 MON H I 3 MONTHS
RANT 8-Feb-95 -3.15% -11.13% -6.74% 0.34% -4.07% -25.18%
GÖLtÂŞ ÇİMENTO 24-Feb-95 4.74% -8.37% -1.67% 2.40% -14.55% -10.59%
B Â ti ÇİMENTO 10-Mar-95 9.39% 4.40% -7.01% -23.86% -21.09% -33.50%
SOKTÂS 24-Mar-95 19.49% 32.66% 18.12% -5.19% 19.13% 30.14%
FRİGO PAK 7-Apr-95 11.26% 18.12% 4.55% 20.73% -4.38% 101.34%
ERBOSÂN 14-Apr-95 14.92YO 6.06% 2.18% '4.84% -0.01% . 13J50/0
OTOKAR 14-Apr-95 23.60% 29.95% 16.36% 6.69% 0.39% 53.53%
ÇBSBOYA 28-Apr-95 2.80% 2.57% -1.24% -9.90% -10.93% 1.87%
GLOBAL 3-May-95 5.88% 5.95% -6.68% -33.'63% -34’31% -5“i731%
ÂRDEM ............ 17-May-95 -2.79% -9.70% -20.00% -17.40% -13.98% 3.06%
ESEMSPOR 24-May-95 -5.06% -3.30% -6.82% -14.24% -19.30% -13.89%
c o m m e r c ia l  û n io n 9-Jun-95 4.30% -2.65% -6.60% -13.54% -8.76% -11.69%
NERGİS 9-Jun-95 -4.17% -2.54% -0.48% -9.75% -12.27% -12.79%
TÜMTEKS 15-Jun-95 -3.40% -19.05% -17.07% -22.61% -10.07% 21.45%
EYAP 16-Jun-95 23.66% 20.42% 27.07% 26.50% 19.45% 21.84%
ALTERNATİFBANK 23-Jun-95 -1.93% -8.81% -12.41% -19.72% -21.27% -23.66%
BOSSA 11-Aug-95 6.52% 2.14% 3.24% 3.81% 4.86% T 24%
KAPLAMIN 24-Aug-95 1.81% -0.60% -1.96% 2.72% “7785% ■"29765%
ADANA ÇİMENTO B 11-Oct-95 -2.60% -2.05% -5.76% 0.41% -13.09% -33.21%
HAZNEDAR 1-Dec-95 20.43% 33.16% 18.63% 32.25% 36.87% 40.73%
EMİNİŞ 15-Dec-95 0.71% -5.39% -4.87% -21.26% -19.06% -26.81%
AVERAGE 6.02% 3.90% -0.44% -4.31% -5.65% 3.90%
STD. DEVIATION 9.50% 14.80% 11.93% 1T09% “ T6.4“2% 35.24%
EXCESS RETURN OF IPOs IN 1994
COMPANY NAME 
TRANSTÜRK FREN' 
EMSAN PASUNM AZ 
YAPI KREOrLEASiNG"
MiLPA
ih u Cs h ö l d In g “
EGEPLAST
SABAH PAZARLAMA 
ÇUMRA KAĞIT 
KEREVİTAŞ
lARIII
03-Dec-93
15-Dec-93
24-Jan-94
25-Jan-94
18-Fe^94
04-Mar-94
04-Mar-94
İDAY
-0.093159
-0.169457
0.4022319
0.2188837
0.136750'l
DARDANEL 
BUGÜN YÂYINCTÛK' 
MUTLU AKÜ 
BORUSÂN
MERKO 
VİKİNĞ 
HÂLKSİGORTA 
GÜNEŞ'SİGORTA' 
ANADOLU BİRÂ_ 
KARSÜ TEKSTİL' '  ■ 
TÜKAŞ' 7  _ 
ÂKSİGORTA 
RAKS İ V  ÂLETLERİ 
AVERAGE 
STOyDEV' 
^STATISTIC
13-May-94
13-May-94
29-ÜUİ-94
05-Aug-94
_25-/^g-94
Ö2-Sep-94
07-Öct-94'
l"4-Oct-94
20-Oct-94
l'6-Nov-94
T7-NOV-94'
17-NOV-94
-0.175038
0.2007655
-0.137719
-0.142424
-0.000508
-0.14T986
Ö.0676676
5 DAYS 
0.2241296
0.0460229
0.1088892
-0.146509
_-Ö.f8477'3
0.0635995
0.3132442
0.146921
0.497782
0.2482944
0.2ÖT3
0.12433 
1.0629953 
0TÖ322307 
0.Ö6272Î 1
0.1923528
23-NOV-94
~24-NÖv-94
07-Dec-94
0.023642 
Ö. 1579894
0.1161408
0.0630911
1.1567T3İ
1.8883155
a0269092
_-0İ72733
-0.285b3'8
\0807179"
0.14‘69396
10 DAYS
_  0.44505 
-0.2Ö3435 
_-0.38T77 
-Ö.3710Ö9
-0.402891
17M35855
0.149636'3
JÖ.Ö345'15
1.7Ö29696
15 DAYS
0.1831281
^0.060171
-p 8 5 8 2 9
'1.291'83Î
0.2796368 
1.06T1254 
-0.Ö2Î855 
0.1448T92 
0.1987906 
_ 0.084424' 
0T07443'41 
aÖ539959 
0.0837Ö33 
Ö‘.Î7Ö5İ329 
2.3015394
a2101022
-0.Ö09908
0^0505949
^ .osjjoes
-0.1478Ö2
o7030769
072114623
ÖT0511429
‘0.1347533
‘0.0589T54
‘Ö lp 7 3 9 3
'Ö.272Î243
Ö.15'Ö6329
-0.420798 
3 6 8 4 ‘998 
_-ÖT52Ö645 
^ p 8 Î ‘487 
_  -0 9 5 8 9  
_-Ö^q40İ77 
p .0181 8 'l‘
0.58İ2808 
-07152481 
-0760205 
-Ö.45911
1 MONTH
^.1_39Î5125 
-Ö.3485Ö52 
P .60 4 7 4 8  
_17611‘9‘429
-IJÖ2T949
^0.4167083
_Ö71578Î93
-Ö725825‘3·
0^06879^^
Ö.Ö538‘116
-aÖ6p21
1.0594428 
_-0 'Î1İ236 
^ . Î8 ‘13768 
0777620 
Ö.0588986 
1.0817385 
_ -0 İO 296  
-0^ Ö94'6‘62 
OÖ85'48‘3 
-1.43901
0.51767579
p7l46Tf94
-Ö7'8'12685
-0.5671649
bj49'76_6
1.03530614'
-0.0925639 
1İ274Ö8Ö3 
"-0.1168961 
17Î80Ö2‘6 Î2  
170694X52 
Ö.0551968 
X X -0,1271 
574721 
-Ö. 1782553 
O 8757031 
-271572639
SjVIONTHS
- p 3 7 3 İ2 İ8  
O.80853968‘l 
‘ -0.53240Ö86 
Xl.3Ö7ÎÖ7829 
17864273‘426 
0.331468157 
Ö7 i7500185 
073Ö57751‘Î5  
-Ö.1İ5TÖ'4'42 
-ÖX05557167 
-Ö. 856249828 
17İ00367'85 
Ö7076678‘92 
1184268235 
1.2İ71'ÖÖ594 
1 İ2 6 8 Î6 5 7 9  
07166103546 
-Ö7ÖÖ6307697 
0.082464117 
‘-0.2b426057 
-1.'17875Ö258 
'P377İ87505 
-Ö‘ .22179962 
0X32206077 
7,4İ7Ö28698
EXCESS RETURN OF IPOs IN 1995
COMPANY NAME 
RANT
GÔLTAÇ ÇÎMÈNfO
BÂTI ÇlMÉNTO
SOKTÂ'S'
FRlGO'PÂK
ERBOSAN
OTOKAR
lARIII
08-Feb-95
24-Feb-95
10-Mar-95
24-Mar-95
07^pr-95
14-Apr-95
ÇBS BOYA 
GLOBAL
ÂRDÉM ________ ‘
ESE^MSf OR __ 
COMMERCIAL UNTo N 
n é r g Ts
tÜM TÉ'KS"
EŸÂP
ÂLtËRNÂTlFBANK
BOSSA ____
KAPLÂMÎN
ÂDANÂÇlMËNTOB
HAZNEDÀR"
EM INI? 
AVERAGE^ 
s jd Td ë v  “
T.STÂflSTIC
14-Apr-95
28-Apr-95
03-May-95
17-May-95
1 DAY
-0.028971
0.0439122
0.0855925
0.0736955 
Ô.0963197 
Ô. 135487
0.2061683
5 DAYS 
-Ô.103756
-0.077815 
0.0390826 
'Ô. 1643474 
o.ioWfg
0.0520858
0.0256673
0.064037
-0.Ô299'12
24-May-95
09-Jun-95
09-Jun-95
15-Jun-95
16-Jun-95
23-Jun-95
11 -Aug-95
24-Aug-95
11-Oct-95
01-Dec-95
15-Dec-95
-0.048419
0.0439802
-0.043936
-0.033441
0.2134956
-0.022242
0.0649829
0.0175294
-0.027792
0.1833092
0.0068913
0.048874
Ô.081704Ï
■2.7412189
0.2697676
0.0271253
0.0604Ô17
10 DAYS
-0:058'2
-0.014764
^0^060234
Ô.f546Ô9
0.0389021
0.0223252
-0.104634
-Ô.Ô29425
-0.027652
-0.02874
-0.222327
0.2006384
-0.106198
0.0213813
-0.005963
-0.019132
0.2842684
-0.05Î923
0^238788
OÂpflM
Ô.8422896
ai43158_1
-0.012267'
-0.069115
^0.204844
-Ô‘ 063378
15 DAYS
0.0026988
0.0192485
-0.195643
024342^9
0.1936587
0.044523
0.Ô718475
-0.095509
-0.362696
1 MONTH
-0.Ô311575
-0.1027552
-Ô.14268‘54
Ô71009898
3 MONTHS
^bj'66W 888
-0.062304082
-0.079392
-0.bÔ5605
-0.205652
Ô.267331Î
-0.146653
■Ô.03lb62i
-0.020329
^0.056493
_Ô.Ï60Ô02
j-Ô'Ô49472
-Ô'0Ï09Ô5
a i  1T53Ô6 
-Ô74'25196
-0.180528
-0.135745
-0.171029
-0.115053
-0.269638
0.253193
-0.23542
0.0379066
0.0296177
0.0041172
jO.2753452
-Ô.2378TÎ
-0.Ô39214
0.l'p2Î78
-07980806
j£ .0421692
_-aoo'oïo3
_Ô.0039637
-07106398
J-Ô/86ÔÏ56
-0.1564499
-Ô72Ô83Ô37
-0.f06326
-0.1380926
-0.1Ô46'252
0.1819902
-0.2561299
Ô.Ô534758
0.0783084
-OJ 548315 
_0j82Î2Ôf
_^b.Î754'Î45 
-aq 6 7 Ï7 Ï9  
^  O.Î5j772 
-2.Ô28T755
j-0^244223056 
_0.Î23'15‘3214 
a6'46253542 
0J2j658142 
” 0.417p7684 
_aÔÏ83Ô5Ô17 
-0.8M39Ï246 
07Ô328843Ô9 
-O.Ï5b7149_47 
■-Ô7l663Ô4q42 
■-Ô. 179590536 
■Ô;23Ô1 38869 
"Ô‘.242Ï443f2
-0.342769045 
3 .0732172Î9 
0390869059 
-b.393773Ï15 
\82p728Jb2
3.177379374
-Ô".bÏ22228'43
Ô.'3Y623536
-Ô.Y77Ï13Ô75
